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Does the Harm Principle Justify Criminal Drug Statutes
Against Drug Use?
By Kyle J. Lucas
Department of Philosophy
kyle.j.lucas@wmich.edu
According to a recent article published in the British Medical Journal Open, the efforts
attempting to control the global illegal drug market are failing. Over the past decades in the
U.S., drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and cannabis have decreased in their inflation-adjusted
price while the purity of such drugs have increased. i What is more, the U.S. spends billions of
dollars annually attempting to reduce drug use and its negative consequences. In fiscal year
2015, President Obama has requested $25.4 billion for such purposes, of which $9.2 billion
will be spent on domestic law enforcement. ii Nevertheless, in recent years—for example
between 2002-2007—there was only a .2% drop in users who depend on, or abuse, illegal
drugs.iii In addition, in 2010 of the 1,362,028 prisoners sentenced under state jurisdiction,
237,000 (or approximately 17%) were convicted for drug offenses; of the 197,050 prisoners
sentenced under federal jurisdiction, 94,600 (or approximately 48%) were convicted for drug
offenses.iv
These facts provide motivation, I believe, to enquire into a fundamental question with
respect to illegal drugs: Why is recreational drug use a crime?v We should be careful to note
here at the outset that this question is not concerned with the prohibitions involving drug
manufacturers or drug sellers; rather, the question centers upon the drug user: Why do we
consider the act of using certain drugs as a form of criminal conduct? vi
Arguments put forth to justify criminal statutes against drug use are numerous and
generally fall into three main categories: Moral perfectionism, harm to self, and harm to
others.vii I believe harm to others is the strongest rationale of the trio capable of justifying the
criminal statutes.viii I will, therefore, focus solely on the arguments put forth that drug use
should be illegal because it harms others. I will adopt the Harm Principle, first articulated by
John Stuart Mill, as the framework to approach this question. The first part of this paper will
briefly characterize the Harm Principle and some of the difficulties in using this principle.
Next, I will look at what I believe are some of the strongest arguments which the Harm
Principle can put forth to justify the illicit status of drugs. In particular, I will claim that
increased risks of harm to others and societal harm are the strongest arguments. Increased
risks of harm will primarily be approached drawing upon the work of Douglas Husak and
several criteria which he puts forth as possible methods of evaluating when risks of harm can
be justifiably proscribed. Societal harm will be approached using Joel Feinberg’s model of
aggregate harm. I will argue that both of these models fail to provide a sufficient rationale to
justify the entire scope of the current criminal statutes against drug use.
The Harm Principle
The Harm Principle was formulated by John Stuart Mill in his work On Liberty. Mill
described his work as examining “the nature and limits of the power which can be
legitimately exercised by society over the individual.” ix For Mill, a fundamental problem with
law hinged upon the tension between liberty and authority. In order to protect liberty while at
the same time justifying the coercive nature of law, Mill formulated one, crucial principle:
“the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which
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power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others.” x
Perhaps we should first get clear on who, exactly, the “others” are which the community
is protecting. Mill seems to suggest that, at the very least, the others are members of the
civilized community in question. For our intents and purposes, this would apply to any U.S.
citizen living under U.S. jurisdiction. We might raise questions here about the status of nonU.S. citizens living in the United States, U.S. citizens living abroad, as well as non-U.S.
citizens living outside of the United Stated; however, I think this restricted notion of the other
will allow us to investigate the question at hand without seriously affecting the argument of
this paper. We might also be concerned with the status of those whom the others are being
protected against (i.e. those who harm the others); however, from Mill’s definition above, we
can see that he is only concerned with members of the community in question (“any of their
number”). Thus, in our case, we can again restrict this group to U.S. citizens living under U.S.
jurisdiction.
We should also note some other major obstacles which face this principle before
proceeding. Perhaps the most notable difficulty is to discern whether an action affects only the
actor doing the action or society and others. After all, it would seem almost every action of an
individual affects society in some manner. Mill was not insensitive to this difficulty. He
asked, “How…can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference
to other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do
anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his
near connections.”xi In response, Mill argued that only when there is definite damage, or
definite risks of damage, does liberty reach its bounds. xii Mill provides an example to
demonstrate his point. He held that that “If…a man, through intemperance or extravagance,
becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family,
becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them, he is deservedly
reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for the breach of duty to his family or
creditors, not for the extravagance.”xiii What Mill seems to be suggesting is that actions too
remote on the causal chain cannot warrant proscription. We will deal with this conception and
related problems in more detail below.
Another difficulty faced by those seeking to employ the Harm Principle is to give a clear
definition of what constitutes as harm. This has proved exceedingly difficult. Of notable
interest, Joel Feinberg has attempted to give an adequate formulation, arguing that harm is a
setback to interest.xiv Generally speaking, the idea is that when someone is harmed, they are
worse off than they would have been otherwise. This formulation also has its problems which
are beyond the scope of this paper.xv For our intents and purposes, using a putative conception
of harm will suffice. In other words, we will recognize harm when we see it. Thus, although
giving a precise definition of harm might be difficult, when we look at a particular case
involving drug use and harm to others, we should be able to recognize whether the case in
question constitutes as involving harm to others.
A final difficulty in using the Harm Principle, and of notable importance for the purposes
of this paper, is to establish how much harm, or how much risk of harm, is sufficient to justify
criminalizing an action. This problem is perhaps the most manageable of the three. Joel
Feinberg noted two important factors involved in assessing when this is the case: the
magnitude of harm and the likelihood that the action will result in harm. The relationship
between the magnitude and likelihood of harm and the justification for criminalizing a
conduct is spelled out by Feinberg: “the greater the probability of harm, the less grave the
harm need be to justify coercion; the greater the gravity of the envisioned harm, the less
probable it need be.”xvi Feinberg refers to the combination of the likelihood and the magnitude
of harm as risk, which is how I will employ the term for the remainder of this paper. To better
see the relationship of risk with respect to the likelihood of harm and the magnitude of harm,
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consider the following cases which both carry significant risk: (1) Driving 80 mph down a
country road at night carries a relatively low probability of causing harm to some other
person; however, should a harm occur, the magnitude would be great. (2) Second hand smoke
has a high probability of causing harm to others, but the magnitude is relatively low.
Attempting to quantify the exact level of risk needed to criminalize harm is beyond the scope
of this paper; rather, I will use a comparative approach and examine actions which carry a
similar risk to use of illicit drugs.
The Harm Principle and Drug Use
We are now in a position to apply the Harm Principle to test whether drug use causes
sufficient harm to others or poses a risk of harm to others significant enough to warrant the
current statutes. What is immediately apparent is that in most all cases of drug use there is not
direct harm to others. In other words, it is not the case that as a direct consequence of using
drug [x] another person [y] is harmed. For instance, in only a few exceptions is it the case that
a heroin user, by consuming or injecting heroin, causes direct harm to another person. Husak
helps explain: “One possible way to describe this distinction is to say that drug use is
indirectly harmful to others, whereas these other crimes are directly harmful to others. These
labels draw the following distinction. Every act of burglary or rape is harmful to others…By
contrast, not every act of drug use is harmful to others.” xvii One notable exception involves
pregnant women.xviii We should note that this seems to fall outside of the scope of “others”
with respect to our definition above. Yet even if we do consider a fetus as an “other”, I do not
think this is what most people have in mind when they attempt to justify the criminal drug
statutes. Should cases such as pregnancy be a major concern, a law specifically oriented
towards pregnant mothers using drugs would seem more appropriate than criminalizing the
conduct in general.
It seems, then, the strongest arguments which can be brought forth using the Harm
Principle must involve risks of harm, where the act of using a certain drug is not in itself
harmful, but it raises the likelihood that some other harmful act occurs. In order to approach
this rationale, we will look at two general types of harm to others laid out by Feinberg: risks
of harm to private persons and risks of harm to the public, society, or state. xix
Risks of Harm to Others (Private Persons)
Using the Harm Principle, one can argue that certain activities carry a risk of harm to others
which should be criminalized by law. Generally speaking, of the two factors involved in risk,
it is the likelihood that some harmful event obtains which is the significant factor in question.
Husak helps us spell out this rationale. He holds that such laws “prohibit some conduct x
because it impermissibly increases the likelihood of harm y. Conduct x does not invariably
harm anyone, but it impermissibly increases the likelihood that a harm y…will occur.”xx
Husak proceeds to describe how this might occur: “Sometimes the probability of y is raised
because the agent who performs x is more likely to commit a subsequent harmful act.” xxi
Some clear examples of current criminal statutes which prohibit activities based upon the
increased risk of harm include drinking and driving and speeding. For instance, drinking and
driving increases the likelihood of a subsequent harmful act (e.g. a car accident). Although the
likelihood of a car accident still might remain relatively low at certain blood alcohol content
levels, car accidents carry a significant magnitude of harm. Thus, even a slight increase in
likelihood might raise the risk of harm to such an extent we deem the action should be
prohibited.
Increased risks of harm are some of the most common arguments evoked against drug
use, such as the connections made between drug use and crime. For example, we might put
The Hilltop Review, Winter 2014

36

The Harm Principle and Criminal Drug Statutes

forth the argument that someone who takes drug [x] is more likely to commit some harmful
crime [y]; thus, we can say there is an increased risk of harm from taking drug [x]. As Husak
notes, however, the scope of when it is justifiable to criminalize activities which create
increased risks of harm has not been clearly defined. In response to this difficulty, Husak has
put forth four principles which he argues should be requirements to justify making certain
conducts criminal based upon their capacity to increase the likelihood of some harm.
Although I take these to be prima facie principles insofar as they may have exceptions, I
believe they offer a meaningful framework for evaluating risks of harm created by drug use.
The first principle Husak refers to as the “Inchoate Principle.” According to Husak,
“Conduct x should not be criminalized on the ground that it increases the likelihood of harm y
unless conduct that directly and deliberately causes y should also be prohibited.”xxii The idea
seems most fitting in cases where some act [x] increases the likelihood of a harm [y]
indirectly through some other conduct [z]. Suppose, for instance, that we deem drinking and
driving [x] as unacceptably increasing the likelihood of a terrible car accident [y]. Often, this
risk is indirect; for instance, alcohol can create a certain disposition to drive recklessly [z].
Reckless driving directly causes terrible car accidents. Thus, it would be strange indeed if we
prohibited drinking and driving but not reckless driving. xxiii With respect to drug use, such
reasoning is prevalent. For example, Husak points out that many argue drug use causes an
increased likelihood that people become unproductive and lazy, which in turn carries a risk
that they might harm society through a reduction of productivity towards the common good.
However, neither being unproductive nor lazy are forms of criminal conduct themselves,
despite the fact that they directly cause the loss of productivity for the common good.
There may be exceptions to this principle that relate to drug use. For example, having a
mental disorder is not criminal, yet it might be the direct cause of many harmful acts.
Supposing there to be a drug which throws someone into this state of mind, we might think
this qualifies as a reason to criminalize the drug but not the mental disorder itself. This
reasoning carries weight and may very well hold for some drugs; however, I am not sure it
will hold in most cases under further scrutiny. I think the burden of proof lies upon those
attempting to uphold the prohibitions to demonstrate this is the case. There are at least two
conditions which should be met for such cases: First, whatever the mental disorder, it would
need to carry a significant risk of harm to others. Second, the drug itself would need to carry a
certain likelihood that people who use it develop the mental disorder. What is more, by
looking at alcohol as a comparative example, I think we have reason to be hesitant that the
above objection will work in most cases of illegal drugs. Generally speaking, consuming
alcohol seems to carry a similar likelihood that a person will develop a risk-prone mental
disorder as do most illegal drugs. Some rationale must be provided, then, as to why we deem
such risks associated with alcohol consumption as falling outside the bounds of criminal law
while those of the well-known illicit drugs fall within its scope.
The second principle is the “Triviality Principle.” Husak holds that “[c]onduct x should
not be criminalized on the ground that it increases the likelihood of harm y unless y is a
substantial harm.”xxiv By substantial, I take Husak to be referring to the magnitude of the
harm. In other words, if the magnitude of the harm is relatively low, then even under
conditions where there is a high likelihood of harm, its risk would not warrant criminalizing
the conduct. Thus, for example, consider a lazy drug user: Suppose we have the tools to
calculate that using drug [x] will significantly increase the likelihood of a loss of productivity
[z] which causes [y] amount of harm in each instance. Even if the likelihood of harm is high,
it would seem in such cases that the magnitude of harm is significantly low—too low,
perhaps, to criminalize the conduct.
This principle faces a significant challenge. It may be argued that, although it is true each
individual instance carries a small amount of harm, taken as a whole, the aggregate is quite
substantial. Much the same reasoning can be applied to littering: An individual case of
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littering does not cause much harm to the environment, but taken as the whole the harm can
be quite substantial. I will not deal extensively with this challenge here, as it will fall under
“societal harm” and be dealt with in the next section.
The final two principles deal with causation. Husak’s third principle is the “Remoteness
Principle.” He argues “[c]onduct x should not be criminalized on the ground that it increases
the likelihood of harm y unless x and y are sufficiently proximate.”xxv In other words, if an
action [x] is quite distant in the causal chain connecting the action with the end harm, this
might be a good reason to deny that action [x] should be criminalized. Generally speaking, to
see if some action is the proximate cause of some effect, a foreseeability test is used where we
would ask the question: Could harm [y] have been reasonably predicted given action [x]?
Determining whether some action can be considered the proximate cause of an event has
caused a considerable amount of debate in jurisprudence. This issue is beyond the scope of
this paper; however, a few brief comments should suffice for our purposes: First, we should
note that concerns with proximate causation are not the same as those which are concerned
with the “cause in fact”, also known as the “but-for” cause. In many cases, we may want to
say that had a person not taken a certain drug [x], harm [y] would not have happened. This
would pass the “but-for” test, meaning that without action [x], harm [y] could not have
occurred, but this does not necessitate that it is a proximate cause of the event (i.e. that it was
foreseeable). By and large, I think most of the harms which are connected with drug use are
too remote on the causal chain to warrant the criminal statutes under this principle. Rather, I
think what most people have in mind when they evoke a causation argument is that using drug
[x] was the “but-for” cause of harm [y]. For instance, suppose someone takes drug [x]. This
causes an addiction, which in turn causes numerous other events to take place, such as the
user losing his job and money. At the end of the causal chain, the user commits a robbery and
thereby causes harm [y]. We might say that drug use was the “but-for” cause of the harm
(which will be dealt with more in the next principle); however, in terms of proximity, the use
of the drug is quite remote from the actual harmful event. xxvi I think it would be a hard case to
make that the harm in question was foreseeable, thereby providing a justification for the
prohibition against use of the drug. Thus, it seems this principle will come of short of being
convincing in most cases.
The fourth principle Husak terms the “Empirical Principle.” He holds “[c]onduct x should
not be criminalized on the ground that it increases the likelihood of harm y unless there is an
established causal connection between x and y in a reasonably high percentage of cases.” xxvii
The concern here is not how close action [x] lies to harm [y] on the causal chain, but whether
there is a strong causal connection between the two. This is perhaps the most powerful
argument brought against drug use in favor of its criminalization, and I think it is what most
people have in mind when they say that the use of a certain drug was the “but-for” cause
behind some harm. Most commonly, this occurs in the form of arguing that drug use increases
the likelihood of criminal behavior. There is certainly a strong correlation between drug use
and crime. With respect to violent crime, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS),
“about 26% of the victims of violence reported that the offender was using drugs or
alcohol.”xxviii In addition, Norman Miller and Sara Spratt, examining legal issues concerning
drug and alcohol addiction, note that more than 50% of murderers were using alcohol, drugs,
or both, at the time of their crime. xxix With respect to prisoners, the BJS notes “In the 2004
Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 32% of state prisoners and
26% of federal prisoners said they had committed their current offense while under the
influence of drugs.”xxx
At face value, these statistics make it seem reasonable to argue that, indeed, there is an
established causal connection between drug use and criminal activity in a high percent of
cases. Nevertheless, looking further into the issue, I think there are substantial objections
against this argument. The first important point to call into consideration is what Husak refers
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to as the “systemic” effect of drug use leading to crime. According to Husak, this category
includes “offenses within dealing hierarchies to enforce normative codes, retaliate for real or
imagined crimes of competitors or informers, resolve disputes involving territory or
possession of drugs, punish customers who fail to pay debts, and so on.”xxxi Thus, part of the
problem in obtaining reliable statistic between drug use and crime is that many of the crimes
might be drug related in the sense that, if there were not legal statutes making drugs illegal in
the first place, such crimes would have never taken place. In addition, the fact that someone
involved with drugs happened to be using drugs in a drug-related crime should not come as a
surprise. For instance, if a drug dealer commits assault against a client who does not pay, the
correlation that the dealer was on drugs at the time of the crime does not necessarily imply
causation (that drug use was the culprit causing the crime) or at any rate that drug use was the
“root cause”: i.e. that the drug was the fundamental cause or initiator of the criminal act.
Another reason to doubt that drug use, itself, is a significant causal agent in creating an
increased likelihood of crime involves what Husak referred to as an “economic effect.” xxxii
The basic argument here is that the correlation between drug use and crime can to a large
extent be explained as resulting from the fact that drug users turn to crime in order to support
their expensive drugs habits. Thus, it is not drug use per se that causes the criminal activity
but rather the limited supply and high costs. These factors—caused largely by the legal
sanctions placed upon drugs—result in drug users becoming poor and desperate to continue
their habit. For instance, one could imagine that if alcohol were made illegal, there would be
alcoholics who would commit crimes to get their drink. That drug users commit crimes in
order to raise money for their drug habits is strongly corroborated by the BJS: “In 2004, 17%
of state prisoners and 18% of federal inmates said they committed their current offense to
obtain money for drugs.”xxxiii
A third and perhaps most significant reason why we might call into doubt the causal
connection is that, even supposing that drug use was a significant causal factor in crimes
committed under the influence of drugs, there is a low likelihood that drug users actually
commit crimes. Husak explains:
Theorists who believe that drugs cause crime must explain why relatively few users of
recreational drugs become criminals. Although the majority of criminals may be drug
users, the majority of drug users are not (otherwise) criminals. Continued criminality is
more predictive of drug use than continued drug use is predictive of criminality.
Approximately 14.5 million people use an illicit drug each month. Only a tiny fraction is
arrested for crimes, although no one knows how many commit offenses that are
undetected. The fact that only a small minority of drug users resort to criminality raises a
serious difficulty for those who conclude that LAD [laws against drugs] satisfies the
conditions for justified anticipatory legislation. xxxiv
Thus, taking into consideration the factors noted above, I believe we have reason to doubt that
this principle sufficiently establishes a justification for the drug statutes.
Using the four principles outlined by Husak help develop an account for when it is
justifiable to criminalize actions which cause substantial risks of harm. As we can see,
however, this argument faces considerable challenges if we are to be convinced. Nevertheless,
there remains a strong case to be made that it is actually harm to society in general which
justifies laws against drugs.
Societal Harm
According to Husak’s triviality principle, we should not criminalize risks of harm when the
individual harm of each act is insignificant. Nevertheless, should we add each individual act
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together, the aggregate harm to society can be quite significant. Thus, perhaps societal harm
provides a convincing rationale to criminalize the risks of harm created by drug use.
Societal harm, as argued by Feinberg, is a harm of public interest. Feinberg defines
public interest as “a ‘common,’ or widely shared, specific interest.” xxxv It is a common interest
which nearly all members of society have, for example, avoiding epidemic sicknesses,
providing a sustainable environment in which one can live, and having economic prosperity.
Acts can be considered harmful to society even if an individual act is relatively harmless
itself. For instance, a single act of littering causes little harm. Nonetheless, the sum total of
harm caused by all the individual acts in a given time might end up being quite substantial. If
the aggregate of the harms push us past a certain unacceptable level, then we have a strong
reason to prohibit such acts. Feinberg refers to these types of harm as “aggregate-harm.”xxxvi
Thus, in the case of drugs, one might argue that although each individual use of a certain drug
causes a small amount of harm, the aggregate is substantial enough to warrant the criminal
statute.
Since we are dealing with drugs already proscribed, it is not enough to merely take
current aggregate to see whether we are past the unacceptable threshold. If one were to argue
that even with the current proscriptions we are past the threshold, this would not be
problematic, as this person would certainly not argue we should remove the prohibitions;
however, even if we think that the current aggregate is below the threshold, we must ask a
further question: What would happen to the aggregate level should we lift the prohibition on
drugs? This involves that we make a prediction about how many people would participate in
the activity (taking the drug in question) and project the change in the level of aggregate
harm. We should take careful note here, then, that the current level of aggregate harm need
not be past the threshold to justify proscribing an activity. For instance, for many illicit drugs,
we might say that currently the aggregate harm is lower than the threshold required to justify
proscription; however, should the drug in question be made legal, the aggregate might swell
to an unacceptable level. Therefore, one seeking to justify the criminal status of drugs
according to societal harm must convincingly argue that either drugs currently cause an
unacceptable level of aggregate harm or would cause an unacceptable level if not proscribed.
The later argument is what one might call the ‘epidemic scenario.’ The argument runs that if
drugs were to be decriminalized or legalized, it would result in an epidemic of societal harm.
Overall, societal harm seems to carry some weight at first glance; however, as we shall
see, I believe it faces significant challenges. First, since there is no objective threshold which
determines when there is enough societal harm to justify criminal sanctions, we must rely on
comparative cases. Such cases do exist, and I think they leave us open to doubt the aggregate
level is high enough to warrant proscription. In addition, I believe there is also reason to doubt
an epidemic scenario on a scale which would push us past the aggregate threshold would
occur.
First, let us examine the argument that the current aggregate level of harm created by
illicit drug use warrants its criminal status. This claim is open to doubt primarily on the
grounds that there exists other activities which cause a greater aggregate harm which are not
themselves proscribed. Most notably, this is the case with alcohol, which is interesting given
its affinity with drug use and crime. It seems fairly uncontroversial that the amount of
aggregate harm caused by alcohol is higher than that of most illicit drugs. Even if we assume
that alcohol causes considerably less harm on average per user than most illicit drugs, the
aggregate must still be far greater given that more people use and abuse alcohol than any
illegal drug. But what is more, there is evidence that alcohol is one of the most socially
harmful drugs in widespread use. For instance, recent research attempting to quantify the
harm to society from substance abuse was conducted in Scotland. The study found that
“[t]here was no stepped categorical distinction in harm between the different legal and illegal
substances.”xxxvii On a scale of 0-3, the researchers averaged the scores of all users. The social
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harm of alcohol was averaged at 2.70 coming in second only to heroin at 2.72. Other notable
drugs included cocaine, which had a social harm score of 2.33, and cannabis which scored at
1.61, second to last behind magic mushrooms which had a score of 1.60. xxxviii
Three responses might be available to continue justifying the illicit status of drugs as a
societal harm. First, one could argue that alcohol should, in fact, be illegal. I will not deal with
this response as I do not believe most people actually hold it. If one were to use this line of
reasoning, the issue would hinge upon the grey area of when there is sufficient harm to
criminalize an activity. Second, one could argue that lifting the prohibitions on drug use
would push us past the acceptable level of aggregate harm. I will deal with this criticism
shortly. Finally, George Sher put forth the following argument, noting the parallels between
illegal drugs and alcohol and stating that the arguments for criminalization of the two seem to
stand or fall together: “the reason drugs take us past the threshold [referring to the permissible
level of aggregate harm] is that alcohol has already gotten us part of the way there. It may be
the case, in other words, that either alcohol or the use of drugs by itself would not produce
more harms or bads than a reasonable society can tolerate, but that in combination they would
produce harms and bads that surpass the threshold.” xxxix Ultimately, I think this argument
stands or falls with the “epidemic scenario”, since this argument implies that should illicit
drugs be decriminalized or legalized, then we would pass the harm threshold.
This brings us to the final argument we will examine in favor of the laws against drug
use. It is a common argument in defense of the prohibitions: If drug prohibitions are removed
(the argument is also commonly applied to decriminalization policies as well), the aggregate
level of harm will exceed the acceptable threshold. In other words, by legalizing drug use,
there will be a surge in the number of users which will significantly increase the aggregate
harm. This argument, however, faces a significant challenge. Husak argues that there is
simply no empirical data supporting the idea that should proscriptions be removed, a large
amount of people would turn to drug use. He references a work by Robert MacCoun and Peter
Reuter, which found that few people said they abstained from drugs, or quit after using drugs,
for legal reasons. If this is true, it implies that we should not expect a significant change in
drug use should the prohibitions be lifted. In turn, we should not expect a substantial increase
in the current level of aggregate harm.
Part of the problem with the argument noted above is a lack of empirical evidence to
support one side or the other. A recent case, however, corroborating the argument that use
levels would not significantly change can be seen by looking at a decriminalization policy
implemented by Portugal. A brief word about the policy: It is not a policy of legalization.
Furthermore, drug trafficking is still criminalized. Possessing “for one’s own consumption”
any of the well-known illicit drugs constitutes as an administrative offense, not a criminal
offense. Administrative offenses can result in a fine between 25 euros and the minimum
national wage; however, Glen Greenwald, reviewing the policy, notes “but such fines are
expressly declared to be a last resort. Indeed, in the absence of evidence of addiction or
repeated violations, the imposition of a fine is to be suspended.”xl Thus, despite not being
legalized, users do not face harsh legal penalties. The effect on usage rates has been surprising
and gives us reason to doubt what most supporters of criminalization argue. From 2001 (when
the policy was implemented) to 2007, those aged 15-19 saw a slight decrease (2-3%) while
those aged 20-24 saw a slight to mild increase (8-9%) in terms of their lifetime prevalence
rates (how many people have consumed a certain drug over the course of their lifetime). xli
Overall, then, there was only a slight increase in drug use by those aged 15-24. Granted, this
policy was one of decriminalization and not of legalization; however, the “epidemic scenario”
argument is commonly applied to both policies. This is not to say that if the argument fails
with respect to decriminalization, then it also must fail with respect to legalization, but I
believe this data gives us reason to doubt that an epidemic scenario would take place should
drug use prohibitions be lifted altogether. xlii
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Conclusion
This paper sought to investigate whether the Harm Principle could provide a sufficient
rationale to justify the current drug proscriptions. A few points are worth reviewing: Increased
risks of harm are one of the most significant arguments used to justify the proscriptions
against drug use. Using several principles laid down by Husak, I believe it evident that it is
difficult to construct a wholly convincing argument that drug users create a risk of harm
significant enough to justify the criminal statutes. Furthermore, the argument that drug users
create enough social harm to justify the prohibitions also faces severe challenges. Thus, the
Harm Principle does not provide a conclusive argument that drug users should face criminal
sanctions.
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